Could China Target Gaps in Starlink's Supply Chain Strategy?

China is building a strategy to counter Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network – and it begins with the supply chain.

Researchers in China are dissecting not only the technology behind the satellites but also the global web of suppliers that supports them.

The network, built and operated by Musk’s company SpaceX, is best known for providing high-speed internet through thousands of low-Earth orbit satellites.

In Beijing, it’s also seen as a military threat tied too closely to the US. Chinese defence experts are now mapping the entire Starlink system to understand how it can be tracked, disrupted or disabled.

Targeting logistics and hardware

A review of 64 scientific papers published by Chinese researchers shows how their focus sharpened after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Starlink’s ability to keep Ukrainian communications online and support reconnaissance drones had a clear battlefield impact. This, Chinese academics say, shows how dual-use technologies, civilian systems with military potential, can shift military balances.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA), China’s national armed forces, are proposing tactics ranging from space surveillance to sabotage.

One approach involves launching small satellites to follow and track Starlink units in orbit. These “tailing” satellites could intercept signals or even deploy corrosive materials to damage onboard systems like batteries or disrupt solar panels using ion thrusters.

Some of the more extreme methods include the use of deepfakes to simulate fake targets, or mounting space-targeting lasers on stealth submarines with the goal of physically burning equipment in orbit. All these proposals come from peer-reviewed scientific papers in Chinese journals—some affiliated with China’s National University of Defense Technology.

In one 2023 paper, professors wrote: "As the United States integrates Starlink technology into military space assets to gain a strategic advantage over its adversaries, other countries increasingly perceive Starlink as a security threat in nuclear, space and cyber domains."

The approach doesn’t stop at satellites as researchers are particularly interested in Starlink’s supply chain.

One paper describes how the company uses “more than 140 first-tier suppliers and a large number of second-tier and third-tier suppliers downstream,” with “limited supervision for cybersecurity.” This layered supplier network, stretching across multiple countries, presents an opportunity for interference or disruption through non-military means.

Is Starlink's scale raising alarms?

Starlink now makes up the majority of active satellites in orbit, with SpaceX operating more than 8,000 satellites and planning tens of thousands more.

For governments around the world, this concentration of communication power in the hands of one commercial operator with close ties to US defence has become a concern.

These aren’t just anxieties in Beijing. Some of America’s allies are openly questioning the strategic wisdom of relying on a platform owned by a volatile businessman.

Christophe Grudler, a French member of the European Parliament, says: "We are allies with the United States of America, but we need to have our strategic autonomy."

He has led legislative work on the European Union’s own satellite project, IRIS2, aimed at building an alternative to Starlink.

In addition to military concerns, the vast reach of the network has caused political unease.

Musk’s influence has raised questions about accountability and oversight. For example, Brazil’s government announced a deal with Chinese-backed firm Qianfan shortly after Musk fell out with a Brazilian judge who was investigating content on Musk’s social platform, X.

Chinese researchers claim to have simulated Starlink’s satellite positions and determined that the system can offer uninterrupted coverage of Beijing, even though SpaceX doesn’t officially operate in China. This finding plays into Beijing’s wider argument: that Starlink’s reach is too wide and its control too narrow.

China builds its own constellation

In response, China is moving ahead with its own megaconstellation projects.

The state-backed China SatNet has launched the first 60 satellites of its planned Guowang constellation, which will eventually include 13,000 satellites. This is complemented by private-sector efforts such as Qianfan, a company supported by the Shanghai government, which has already launched 90 satellites toward a planned fleet of 15,000.

Qianfan’s focus is broader than China. The company is signing deals with states like Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan and Uzbekistan. The aim appears not just to rival Starlink but to offer geopolitical alternatives in key regions.

Chinese assessments point out that while Starlink’s reach offers global communication, its shared infrastructure also creates shared risk.

Any action against a satellite over Chinese territory could affect users in the US, Europe or Ukraine. The growing overlap between civilian users and military concerns increases the likelihood of miscalculation, or what some analysts call “collateral damage” in global communications.

As researchers in China continue to study the network, their conclusions highlight a shifting digital battlefield—one where control over orbital supply chains, satellite links and their support systems may become just as strategic as traditional military hardware.