Can Global Farming Survive Hormuz Disruption?

The intensifying conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran could trigger a worldwide food crisis, as the practical shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz threatens to disrupt fertiliser supplies and agricultural production across the globe.

Following US and Israeli missile strikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities on 28 February 2026, passage through the strait – which typically handles approximately one-fifth of the world's liquefied natural gas and crude oil – has effectively halted.

While rising energy costs have dominated headlines, with Brent crude reaching US$120 per barrel, experts suggest that interrupted fertiliser exports from the Gulf region may prove equally catastrophic for global food security.

Gulf nations represent significant producers and exporters of fertiliser, with Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain together responsible for 23% of global ammonia trade and 34% of global urea trade in 2024, according to the International Fertiliser Association. The broader Middle East region accounted for nearly 30% of global export supply for major fertilisers, including nitrogen, phosphate and potash.

A 2025 analysis by analytics firm Kpler estimated that closure of the Strait of Hormuz could tighten fertiliser supply chains by 33%, with sulphur supplies declining by 44% and urea by 30%. Egyptian urea prices, a global benchmark, have already climbed by more than 25%, reaching US$625 per metric tonne, up from US$484 to US$490 between 17 February and 23 February.

A structural shock to global economy

In his analysis for the World Economic Forum, Robert Muggah, Founder of the Igarapé Institute, argues that the conflict has evolved beyond a regional military crisis to become a "structural shock" to the global economy.

Robert contends that while media coverage focuses on military operations, the true danger lies in the strangulation of the Strait of Hormuz. 

"The Strait of Hormuz... has long been described in terms of its significance for oil. That framing is incomplete... it is a chokepoint for an interlocking web of commodity flows," Robert states.

He identifies the disruption to fertiliser supplies as particularly concerning, noting that a 30% spike in urea prices endangers global food security just as Northern Hemisphere planting begins. "What begins as a battlefield shock hardens into a geoeconomic one," he warns.

The economic implications extend far beyond immediate supply disruptions, with the potential to reshape global trade patterns and food security frameworks for years to come.

Second-order effects are emerging

The crisis reaches beyond Gulf fertilisers' inability to access export markets in countries such as Sudan, Brazil and Sri Lanka. Second-order effects are already appearing, echoing the supply chain disruptions witnessed during Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Deprived of natural gas supplies from Qatar, fertiliser firms in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan have been compelled to cease production. Egypt, another significant producer, has lost its gas imports from Israel and must turn to the increasingly expensive LNG market.

The damage reaches beyond nitrogen to phosphorus, another essential crop nutrient. Gulf countries produce around 20% of phosphate fertilisers and a quarter of global sulphur, which is largely an oil and gas by-product.

Fertiliser producers require sulphur, specifically sulphuric acid, to convert phosphate rock into a form that plants can absorb.

Severe implications for food production

The consequences for food production could be severe. Roughly half of global food production depends on synthetic nitrogen, and crop yields would fall dramatically without fertiliser.

The resulting shortages could push up prices of household staples such as bread, pasta and potatoes, whilst making animal feed more costly. Regional countries face particular exposure.

Iran, the Gulf states and their neighbours, comprising more than 60 million people, remain almost entirely import-dependent for rice (77%), corn (89%), soybeans (95%) and vegetable oils (91%). In Iran, food price inflation has risen 40% over the past year, with rice prices increasing sevenfold.

Robert concludes: "The cost of war often registers in the quieter arithmetic of farms that will be under-fertilized, flights that will be rerouted, industrial inputs that will be harder to source, and families that will pay more for food."